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ARGUMENT
A)

Blaisdell Holds that Summary Judgment is Appropriate in Gross
Negligence Cases Onlv Where a Plaintiff Cannot Establish Ordinary
Negligence

Rocky Mountain Outfitters ("RMO") contends that, "Blaisdell represented 'the
original and best reading' of Berry." (Def. Opp at p. 17). The Supreme Court of Utah in
Berry determined that when a plaintiff can withstand a summary disposition on ordinary

negligence, then summary judgment on gross negligence is inappropriate unless the
standard of care is fixed by law and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as
to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. 1 The Blaisdell Court's holding is
entirely consistent with this reading, in that, if a plaintiff cannot establish ordinary
negligence he cannot establish gross negligence. 2
Ms. Penunuri contends, that neither the Court of Appeals nor RMO fully
Ga

understood Blaisdell and its interpretation of Berry as they completely missed Berry's
condition precedent. In particular, in Berry, the Supreme Court of Utah noted:
[w]ere we evaluating this case as one of ordinary negligence, we would
have little difficulty discerning the presence of genuine issue of material
fact sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Berry
presented testimony of an experienced ski racer, coach, and jumper who
witnessed Mr. Berry's accident and faulted the jump design. A second
expert in ski racecourse design and safety was likewise critical of the
configuration of the accident site. 3

After the Berry Court found that there was a basis for ordinary negligence, it then
determined:
@

1

See Berry v. Greater Park City Co., 2007 UT 87, ,l,l28, 30, 171 P.3d 442.
See Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Systems, Inc., 2012 UT 37, ,l15, 284 P.3d 616.
3
See Berry, 2007 UT 87, at il 28.
2

@

1

We have held that where a standard of care is not 'fixed by law,' the
determination of the appropriate standard is a factual issue to be resolved
by the finder of fact. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 825. Identification of the proper
standard of care is a necessary precondition to assessing the degree to
which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care-the core test in
any claim of gross negligence. Absent the presence of identified,
applicable standard of care to ground the analysis, we hold that the district
court improperly granted [the defendants'] summary judgment and
dismissed [the plaintifrs] gross negligence claim. 4
The Berry Court then applied the Wycalis rule; regarding gross negligence,
summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is
fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to
the defendant's negligence under the circumstances.5 •
The Blaisdell Court did not overturn or alter the rule reiterated in Berry and certainly
does not change the highlighted "and" to an "or" as the Court of Appeals interpreted the

@

case; rather the Blaisdell Court determined that plaintifr s facts did not establish ordinary
negligence, particularly identifying:
[The plaintifr s] claim is less complicated [than Berry and Pearce v Utah
Athletic Found, Inc., 2008 UT 13, 126 n.2]. 'Summary judgment is
generally inappropriate to resolve negligence claims and should be
employed only in the most clear-cut case.' Here it is undisputed that [the
defendant] warned [the plaintiff] to back up his data. In fact, before [the
plaintifrs] employee began installing the G2 Upgrade, the [defendant's]
technical support employee asked for and received oral confirmation from
[the plaintifrs] employee that the office had a current backup. [The
defendant] apparently relied on this confirmation, which, if true, would
have ensured that no data was lost."6
@

See Id at ,I 30.
See Id at ,I 27 see also White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994), which
recognized the rule established in 1989 in Wycalis v. Gardian Title of Utah, 780 P .2d
821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
6
See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37 at ,Il5.

4

5

2

Said otherwise, in Blaisdell the Supreme Court of Utah recognized that the
plaintiff could not establish ordinary negligence and therefore could not establish gross
negligence. 7 The standard of care in Blaisdell was that the data needed to be backed up so
no data would be lost when the computer upgrade was installed. 8 The duty to back up the
data was the plaintiffs not the defendant's. 9 The plaintiff breached his own duty to back
up his own data. 10 It therefore is axiomatic that the defendant could not be held liable for
the plaintiffs breach in the standard of care in ordinary negligence; it is also therefore
axiomatic that if the defendant could not be held liable for ordinary negligence, then the
defendant could not be held liable for gross negligence on the same set of facts. 11
The rule has not changed from Berry: First, to establish gross negligence the
Plaintiff has to have facts sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment on
ordinary negligence. If the plaintiffs facts can establish ordinary negligence, and the
®

standard of care is not 'fixed by law,' then motion for summary judgment is
inappropriate. If the plaintiffs facts can establish ordinary negligence and the standard
of care is fixed by law, then the court can determine if reasonable minds could reach but
one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances. Ms. Penunuri's
case can easily survive a motion for summary disposition on ordinary negligence, and the
standard of care is not fixed by law, therefore summary disposition was inappropriate on
gross negligence.
1

See Id.
See Id.
9
See Id.
10
See Id.
11
See Id.
8
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3

B)

The Court of Appeal's alteration of the Berrv, White, and Wvcalis
test/rule is illogical.

The Rule expressed in Wycalis, and reiterated in Berry and White, that in gross
negligence, "summary judgment is 'inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is
fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's
negligence under the circumstances,"' 12 would be unintelligible if the highlighted "and"
became an "or" as the Court of Appeals determined. 13 Instead of one rule, there would be
two rules that would warrant summary disposition of gross negligence cases and neither
rule would serve justice.

@

If Blaisdell created two separate rules regarding gross

negligence, by changing the "and" to an "or" as the Court of Appeals suggested in
Penunuri: The first rule would be "summary judgment is appropriate where the

applicable standard of care is fixed by law," and the distinct second rule would be
"summary judgment [in gross negligence] is appropriate where reasonable minds could
reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances." 14
What the Court of Appeals failed to address is: How would courts interpret the
first rule? If 'the standard of care is fixed by law' can there only be negligence and not
gross negligence? The plain language would suggest such a result, and would absolve
defendants from gross negligence, even for defendants who violated a law, say someone
going 150 mph down the highway, as well as defendants who were not violating the law,

See 2007 UT 87, ,r 27, 171 P.3d. 442. (quoting White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371,
1374 (Utah 1994) and Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 835 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989).
13
See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2016 UT App 183,120,301 P.3d 984.
14
See Id at ,I21.
12

4
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say someone going 65 mph. In arguendo, if the rule only applied to the defendant who is
compliant with the law, it still would be fraught with problems.
For instance, say there is a fatal accident on Highway I-70 involving a single bus
conclusively determined to have travelled at 79 mph. The claims for gross negligence
were based upon the bus driver driving too fast. The speed limit on I-70 between the
Colorado line and Cove Fort, UT is 80 mph; therefore the driver was within the 80 mph
standard of care fixed by law. In addition, the bus passed its safety inspection every year
and was compliant with the law.

The gross negligence cause of action would be

dismissed as a matter of law pursuant to 12(b)(6), Motion to Dismiss. As a matter of law
(@

the defendant cannot be found grossly negligent, regardless of any additional facts,
because the "reasonable minds question" has been severed from the "fixed by law
question."

Such a rule that a defendant can escape gross negligence if a "standard of

care was fixed by a law" would be unjust.
For instance, in the above example it would not matter if the facts revealed: that
the bus driver knew that when he drove faster than 65 mph his bus shimmies and when he
goes over 70 mph he knows he will lose control; that in the past whenever the driver has
gone over 70 mph, he's lost control of the bus and drove off the road; that on each
occasion when he's driven off the road his passengers have been injured; yet that even
knowing the dangers, the driver accelerated to 79 mph when he arrived at Cove Fort; that
everyone in the bus started yelling at the driver to slow down, but he ignored them; that
as anticipated the bus went off the road and killed some of the passengers; and that he
ultimately admitted that he was utterly indifferent to the consequences of going up to 79
5

mph. Obviously, reasonable minds could conclude that the driver was grossly negligent,
but under the first test, the speed limit is the standard of care fixed by law and since he
did not violate the speed limit, he cannot be found to be grossly negligent.

If the

passengers had also signed a pre-injury release the negligence claims would be dismissed
and the bus driver would not be held liable for any negligence regardless of how reckless
he was.
The second rule that "summary judgment is appropriate where reasonable minds
could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the
circumstances," works only in regards to ordinary negligence.

If it applies to gross

negligence then district courts are again faced with the same dilemmas and issues they
faced prior to Berry and its ilk.
As Berry noted, without a standard of care fixed by law, it is inevitable that a
finder of fact will have to weigh the facts to determine the "appropriate standard of care"
and assess "the degree which conduct deviates, if at all, from the standard of care-the
core test in any claim of gross negligence." 15 In Berry the Court ruled "[a]bsent the
presence of an identified, applicable standard of care to ground the analysis, we hold that
the district court improperly granted [defendant's] summary judgment and dismissed." 16
Likewise in the present case without an applicable standard of care to ground the analysis
it was also improper for the trial court to dismiss and for the Court of Appeals to affirm.

15
16

See Berry, 2007 UT 87 at iJ30.
See Id.
6

GP

C)

Ms. Penunuri's Claims Would Survive a Motion for Summary
Judgment On Ordinary Negligence.

The plaintiff in the Blaisdell Court could not make it through this step but the
plaintiff in the Berry Court had no problem establishing ordinary negligence, and
likewise Ms. Penunuri can easily succeed on a motion for summary judgment on ordinary
7

negligence.1 The facts between Berry and Ms. Penunuri's case are remarkably similar.
The plaintiff in Berry failed to negotiate the course's jump and fell during a skiercross
@

race.

Berry, 2007 UT 87 at ,I28.

Ms. Penunri failed to stay on her horse when it

suddenly and unexpectedly to her accelerated (R. at 941-942, 946). The plaintiff in Berry
fractured his neck, which caused spinal cord syndrome and paralysis. Berry 2007 UT 87
at ,IS Ms. Penunuri suffered a C5-C7 subluxation neck fracture, which caused spinal cord
syndrome (R. at 946, 948-949). The plaintiff in Berry offered expert opinion that pointed
to significant design flaws in the jump that was the site of the fall. 18 • The plaintiff in

Berry testified that the flaws in the design caused Mr. Berry to fall and his injuries. 19 The
Berry Court determined that on these facts, the plaintiff would survive a motion for
summary judgment on ordinary negligence. 20 Ms. Penunuri has an expert, Scott Earl,
who has testified that the guide breached the standard of care when she allowed large
gaps to form in her train of horses (R. at 594, 941-942, pp 89-90; 943, p. 85; 949 p.58-

~

59). Mr. Earl also testified that the guide breached the standard of care when she failed
to stop and close the gaps at the moment when she came upon a steep incline, a sharp
11

See Blaisdell, 2012 UT 37 at ,I15, and Berry, 2007 UT 87 at ,I28.
See Id at ,I6
19
See Id at ,I28.
20
See Id.
18

7

©

blind bend with hikers on the inside of the bend (R. at Id). Mr. Earl testified that the gaps
caused the horse to suddenly, and unexpectedly to Ms. Penunuri, accelerate (R. at 948-

@

949,955, 941-942,949-950, 946).

If the few facts iterated in Berry were enough for its plaintiff to survive a motion
for summary judgment on ordinary negligence, then under Ms. Penunuri' s facts she
should expect the same result.

The facts in Ms. Penunuri's case certainly are plenty

sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment on ordinary negligence; in
particular:
Ms. Penunuri' s expert, Dennis Earl, testified that the standard of care requires that
the gaps between horses cannot extend greater than 4 horse length or 32 feet, and if gaps

<i>

do extend beyond four horse lengths the trailing horse will suddenly accelerate and likely
cause the rider to fall (R. at 941-942 p. 89-90, 1256). Mr. Earl also testified that the
standard of care of 4 horses shrinks to 2 horses (16 feet) if the guide comes upon a

@

danger, such as a sharp bend, a steep incline, or hikers, and as long as there are large gaps
over 16 feet, the added dangers will cause the horse to suddenly accelerate (R. at Id).
RMO's own owner, Joseph Loverage, confirmed Mr. Earl's testimony when he testified
that two to three horse lengths are the maximum distance between horses to keep a
straggling horse from unexpectedly accelerating, and he testified that hazards, such as
hikers, increase the likelihood that a horse will suddenly accelerate if there are gaps in the
train of horses (R. at 590, 1254).
RMO's employee and another guide, Braydon Whitely, testified that two horse
lengths are where he tries to keep the horses, and that RMO's horses in particular are
8

®

likely to suddenly accelerate if the horses get to three horse lengths or 24 feet (R. at
590, 1253, 1262, 644,632).

Mr. Whitely testified that RMO's horses would accelerate

when the gap is ten horse lengths or 80 feet (R. at 644, 632, 1262). RMO's expert
testified that gaps should be two to three horses apart at the maximum (R. at 590,1253).
The gap in front of Ms. Penunuri' s horse, when it came upon the sudden steep section,
the hikers, and the sharp tum, and suddenly accelerated throwing her off and fracturing
her neck, was 125 feet or 16 horse lengths (R. at 1261). Observably, Ms. Penunuri's case
can survive a motion for summary judgment on ordinary negligence, it therefore becomes
a factual issue as to how far RMO's conduct deviated from the standard of care.
Logically, to determine how far a defendant deviated from the standard of care, there has
to be an identifiable applicable standard of care. Berry 2007 UT 87, 130.
D)

Applicable Standard of Care is Not Fixed By Law

As RMO recognizes the applicable standard of care is not fixed by law, therefore

Ci>

determining how far RMO deviated from the standard of care is a factual issue to be
determined by the trier of fact. 21 In Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, this Court
recognized the similarities between its plaintiff and the plaintiff in Berry. 22. The Pearce
Court acknowledged that the plaintiff brought a gross negligence claim the against the
defendant, UAF, and that the district court granted summary judgment on the gross

21
22

See Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation, 2008 UT 13, ,I26, 179 P.3d 760.
See Id.
9

negligence claim because the plaintiff had not "set forth sufficient evidence of gross
negligence."23
However, in Pearce as in Berry, there was no standard of care fixed by law. 24 In
particular, the Pearce Court determined that there was no standard of care regarding the
operation of public bobsled rides upon which the district court could have based its
analysis of gross negligence. 25 The Pearce Court noted that the district court itself
acknowledged that the expert witness in the case "did not opine to the standard of care in
such an industry."26 The Supreme Court of Utah held that without an identified,
applicable standard of care, it was an error for the district court to rule on summary
judgment that, as a matter of law, Pearce could not show gross negligence. 27 Therefore,
the Supreme Court of Utah held that the district court improperly granted summary
judgment to the defendant on Pearce's gross negligence claim, and it reversed and
remanded the case to the district court for a jury trial. 28
In the present case, RMO has repeatedly stated and the district court accepted as
an undisputed fact that there was no standard of care fixed by law, therefore there was no
basis to grant the motion for summary judgment. In RMO's Appellees' brief at footnote
7, RMO twisted Ms. Penunuri's expert's testimony, when RMO claims "[s]ignificant to
the district court was Mr. Earl's admitted unfamiliarity with the industry standard

23

See Id.
See Id.
25
See Id.
26
See Id.
27
See Id.
28
See Id.
24

10

applicable to the trail guiding business and his lack of commercial horseback riding
experience."29 Mr. Earl testified that he knows of no publication or regulation regarding
the standard of care regarding the allowable gaps between horses in a guided trail ride,
for good reason as there are no regulations or publications; Mr. Earl testified as follows:
Q.

With respect to trail guides, there's really not - is there a publication or
regulation or something I can go to figure out what the industry standard
[for gaps between horses] would be?

A.

[Mr. Earl response] I have no idea.

Q.

Do you have any idea how we would determine what [the] industry
standard would be?

A.

Well, most of its common sense. And among horse people, it's not that
hard to figure out what works and what doesn't work, but I don't know
where you would come up with a standard.

Q.

So you would say it would be based largely on experience, then?

A.

Right (R. at 591, 1067, 959).

@

~

RMO's own expert confirmed that there was no standard of care fixed by law,
when he testified that there were no publications or regulations or any promulgated set
@

standards for gaps between horses and that he determines the gaps the same way Mr. Earl
does, through experience (R. at 1066, and 1084 p.60 lines 1-9).

Since the law does not

fix the standard of care, and it is a question of fact for the trier of facts to determine the
degree that RMO deviated from the standard, the inquiry should stop here and Ms.

29

Although not part of the present certiorari, Mr. Earl was paid to guide riders in a
commercial setting a total of 960 times, and guided people on trips thousands of times as
the owner of six to ten horses throughout his life; he is well qualified to testify as to his
experience as to what is needed to keep horses from suddenly and unexpectedly
accelerating on a trail.
11

Penunuri' s case should go to trial. If this Supreme Court of Utah alters the rule, and the
inquiry continues, then nonetheless Ms. Penunuri's case should proceed as she certainly

@

has the facts to establish that RMO was grossly negligent.

E)

Ms. Penunuri's Fact Support Gross Negligence
As discussed supra, it is undisputed that the guide breached the standard of care

when she allowed a 125-foot gap to form to between the riders, and further breached the
standard of care when she came upon three dangers simultaneously and she did not stop
at that moment to close the 125-foot gap (See supra). First, in regards to the 'slight care'
requirements of recklessness, it is axiomatic that the 'slight care' is required to be
observed at the moment that the negligence occurred. For example a driver who stops at
a green light to allow an elderly person to cross the road is showing slight care, but that
same driver cannot escape gross negligence if he runs the next three red lights and he
runs a forth light at an excessive speed and hits and injures a person, as he is not
exhibiting slight care at the moment of the breach of the standard of care. This is true,
even though he testified that he intended to stop at the fifth light.
Second, as RMO points out, "recklessness includes conduct where the actor knew
or had reason to know of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to
another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or
indifference, to that risk. 30 In this instance, Ms. Wright the guide, was taught and
instructed each year that she as the guide must watch out for hazards, watch out for steep

30

See Appellee's Brief at p.24 (quoting Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, 2009 UT
66, ,r 42,221 P.3d 256 and Rst 2 nd of Torts,§ 500 cmt. a (1965)).
12

@

inclines, watch out for steep blind turns, watch out for hikers, warn her guests of
upcoming hazards, and above all else keep her train of horses together, as she is
instructed, "adjust your pace so that large gaps do not form between horses in your string,
[as] gaps encourage horses to trot un-expectedly" (R. at 898, 1252, 1575 at p. 40, 42).
Therefore, RMO's guide, Ms. Wright, knew or had reason to know that gaps created an
unreasonable risk to RMO's guests.
Nonetheless, Ms. Wright had a 125-foot gap between her horses when she climbed
the steep section of trail, passed the steep blind curve, and passed the hikers hiding in the
bushes, and continued to ride up the trail. Ms. Wright had a gap in her train of horses
which was nearly 9 times the distance that even her boss, her coworker, RMO's expert
and .Ms. Penunuri' s expert considered safe, at the time when she passed three known
hazards on the trail. Additionally, Ms. Wright ignored the pleas of the other riders, and in
®

particular Suzanne Moag, to stop and wait until everyone caught up; instead she
proceeded up the trail, past the hazards (R. at 848). (It is irrelevant why she continued up
the trail, as at the moment she came upon the hikers the standard of care required her to

@

stop and close the gap). Lastly, Ms. Wright was taught and it is recognized that only the
guide can close the gaps when they form and Ms. Wright missed her last opportunity to
keep Ms. Penunuri safe when she knowingly and recklessly proceeded to go up the trail
after passing the steep incline, sharp blind curve and hikers without closing the 125 foot
gap (R. at 898, 1252, 1575, at p. 40,42).

13

F)

The Bright Line Berry Test Works and It Is Fair to Both Plaintiff and
Defendants

RMO claims, "under Penunuri's position, summary judgment would be
unattainable in any case of alleged gross negligence, so long as the standard of care is not
'fixed by law.' If adopted, such a rule would deprive litigants and the courts of what has
been described as a 'valuable and necessary' tool in our judicial system." See Appellee's
Brief at Page 20-21. Since 1989, Wycalis's opinion has been the rule adopted by this
Court and it is RMO that is requesting that the rule be abandoned. If this Court abandons

(;;)

the rule, it will be Plaintiffs who will be deprived of having the facts of their case decided
by the jury.

Defendants would seek summary judgment rulings on every gross

negligence case to see how the district court rules on each set of fact pattern. There is no
downside to seeking a motion for summary judgment, if the district court is permitted to
weigh the facts on gross negligence. As Blaisdell recognized, if the facts do not support
ordinary negligence and the defendant can succeed with a motion for summary judgment
on ordinary negligence then summary judgment is also appropriate for gross negligence,
but if the defendant cannot succeed in a motion for summary judgment on ordinary

@

negligence, then the deviation from the standard of care is a factual issue to be
determined by the finder of fact; the jury. 31

31

Defendants claim, "Blaisdell is not the first Utah appellate decision to affirm summary
judgment on a claim of gross negligence." In both cases cited by RMO where this Court
actually found that summary judgment was appropriate for gross negligence, neither case
had actually pied gross negligence. In Blaisdell, as discussed supra, and found to be
unable to establish ordinary negligence, the complaint "does not separately caption gross
negligence," but does allege the defendant "breaches of its duty of care were willful and
wanton, and committed with recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the
14

@

RMO's claims that the "application of the fixed by law standard would also
weaken the ability of parties to contractually allocate risks" is unfounded. RMO has
contractually limited itself from ordinary negligence. A plaintiff who has signed a preinjury release has contractually allocated his risk, as he no longer just needs to establish
that a defendant breached the standard of care and the breach caused the injury, he needs
to establish that the defendant failed to "observe even slight care; [and that] it [was]
carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences
that may result."

According to RMO, "any claim of gross negligence would be

impervious to summary judgment." First, that is not true, if there are not facts to
establish ordinary negligence, as Blaisdell revealed, then the gross negligence claims will
also be dismissed. Second, RMO's assumption is that plaintiffs will file 'unsupportable
or unsustainable' gross negligence claims, so that they can litigate a losing case for years
@

at huge costs.

The rule has been in place since 1989, and if there were a host of

unsupportable or unsustainable gross negligence claims "already afoot" RMO would
surely know of them. RMO has contractually limited its liability for negligence when

consequences that may result" in its ordinary negligence cause of action. The plaintiff in
Blaisdell did not plead gross negligence, but he was requesting punitive damages, and the
language placed in his ordinary negligence cause of action comes from Utah's punitive
damage statute, Utah Code Ann. §78B-8-201. The other case cited by RMO, Moon Lake
Electric Ass 'n Inc. v. Utrasystems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), which was decided a year before Utah adopted the "fixed by law" rule, dealt
with forfeiture of bids on construction projects. The standard for forfeiture is a "bidder
has acted in good faith, without gross negligence, ... " The Court recognized the plaintiff
only alleged ordinary negligence, then noted that the "standard, however [in forfeiture], is
gross negligence ... "
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Ms. Penunuri's signed the release, it should not be able to extend that contract to include
its gross negligence.

This Supreme Court of Utah should not change the rule governing gross
negligence that summary judgment is inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care

~

is fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the
defendant's negligence under the circumstances. In addition it should not find that Ms.
Penunuri's facts could not establish gross negligence under the law. But if this Supreme
Court of Utah does decide to deprive Ms. Penunuri of her chance to have her case heard
by a jury, it would be unfair to then award costs to RMO after depriving her of her right
to have a trial that she had when she had filed her case before the rule was changed.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and those in Ms. Penunuri' s Appellate Brief, Ms.

~

Penunuri respectfully request that this Supreme Court of Utah find in her favor and
reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case for trial. Ms. Penunuri also requests
that this Supreme Court reverse the costs awarded to RMO.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of March 2017.
STRJEPER LAW FIRM
@

sis Robert Strieper

ROBERT D. STRIEPER
Attorney for PlaintifflAppellants
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